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I. INTRODUCTION
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan raises the question of whether citi-
zens of one country can challenge another country's foreign policy
forays, and that policy's resulting human consequences, through judi-
cial means. In this case, plaintiffs challenged various aspects of
United States activity in Nicaragua. The plaintiffs can be divided into
three groups: twelve Nicaraguan citizens,2 twelve members of the
* Mark Gibney is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Purdue University. He
received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1985, his J.D. from Villanova Law
School in 1977, and his B.A. from Boston College.
1. 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
2. Javier Sanchez-Espinoza, "resident of the village of San Francisco de Guajiniquilapa,
Department of Chinandega;" Myrna Cunningham, "resident of Puerto Cabezas, Department
of Zelaya;" Brenda Rocha, "resident of the village of Bonanza, Department of Zelaya;" Maria
Espinal-Mondragon (Viuda de Guevara), individually and as personal representative of
Victorino Guevara-Centeno, "resident of the village of San Francisco de Guajiniquilapa, De-
partment of Chinandega;" Victorino Hernandez-Aguilara, "resident of the village of San Fran-
cisco de Guajiniquilapa, Department of Chinandega;" Jose Santos-Barrera, individually and as
personal representative of Evilio Baquedano Barrera, "resident of the village of San Francisco
de Guajiniquilapa, Department of Chinandega;" Elia Maria Espinoza (Viuda de Moncada),
individually and as personal representative of Ramon Aristides Moncada, "resident of the
village of San Francisco de Guajiniquilapa, Department of Chinandega;" Roseangela Resquita
Grosjean, individually and as personal representative of Dr. Pierre Grosjean, "resident of
Paris, France;" Maria Rigat-Pflaum, individually and as personal representative of Dr. Al-
brecht Pflaum, "resident of Berlin, Germany;" Ullrich Pflaum, individually and as personal
representative of Dr. Albrecht Pflaum, "resident of Frankfurt, Germany;" Maria Bustillo de
Blandon, individually and as personal representative of Ricardo, Leonardo, Gregorio, Juan
Angeles, Nicolas and Antonio Blandon, "resident of La Fragua, Department of Nueva Sego-
via;" Concepcion Lopez-Torres, "resident of Ocotal, Department of Nueva Segovia." Plain-
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United States House of Representatives, 3 and two residents of the
state of Florida.4 The named defendants were nine present or former
officials of the Executive branch including President Reagan, 5 three
non-federal defendants, 6 and a group of unidentified officers or agents
employed by the United States.
7
The Nicaraguan citizens based their suit on allegations that the
United States was providing support to the Contra forces8 who were
tiffs' First Amended Complaint at 1, Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C.
1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (copy in office of Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.).
3. Ronald Dellums (Cal.), William Clay (Mo.), George Crockett (Mich.), John Conyers
(Mich.), Melvyn Dymally (Cal.), Walter Fauntroy (D.C.), Mickey Leland (Tex.), George
Miller III (Cal.), Parren Mitchell (Md.), Major Owens (N.Y.), Gus Savage (Ill.), and Theodore
S. Weiss (N.Y.). Id. at 1-2.
4. Eleanor Ginsberg and Larry O'Toole. Id. at 2.
5. Ronald Wilson Reagan, individually and in his official capacity as President of
the United States; William Casey, individually and in his official capacity as Director
of Central Intelligence; Alexander M. Haig, Jr.; George P. Shultz, individually and
in his official capacity as United States Secretary of State; Thomas 0. Enders, indi-
vidually; Vernon Walters, individually and in his official capacity as United States
Ambassador-at-Large; Caspar Weinberger, individually and in his official capacity as
United States Secretary of Defense; Nestor Sanchez, individually and in his official
capacity as United States Assistant Secretary of Defense; John D. Negroponte, indi-
vidually and in his official capacity as United States Ambassador to Honduras.
Id. at 3.
6. "Max Vargas, individually; Alpha 66 Inc., a Florida corporation; Bay of Pigs Veter-
ans Association, Brigade 2506, Inc." Id.
7. "John Doe and Richard Roe, as yet unidentified officers or agents employed by the
United States." Id.
8. The plaintiff-appellants' brief argues that "when the original Complaint was filed, in
November of 1982, the federal defendants had not yet acknowledged that they were funding,
training and directing the activities of the contras." Brief for Appellants at 11, Sanchez-Espi-
noza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The original complaint filed in November
1982 alleged, however, that:
the federal defendants were implementing a plan which included the following:
(a) providing at least $19 million to finance covert paramilitary operations;
(b) financing the training of invasionary forces including former Somoza National
Guardsmen, and various terrorist groups; (c) conducting CIA intelligence activities
to determine the specific targets for terrorist forces; (d) supporting organizations of
Nicaraguan and Cuban exiles in the United States which, in turn, train and support
invasionary forces; (e) sending at least 50 CIA agents and other U.S. government
agents to Honduras and Costa Rica to participate and assist in covert military opera-
tions directed against the people and government of Nicaragua; and (f) sending at
least 96 U.S. military "mobile training teams" members to advise and train terrorists
to attack Nicaraguan civilians.
Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted).
The original complaint also alleged that "the above plan was reviewed and approved by
defendants Reagan, Casey, Haig, Enders, Weinberger and Sanchez, and that it was imple-
mented from Honduras under the direction of defendants Negroponte and Sanchez." Id. at 12
(citations omitted). The complaint further alleged:
specific details regarding U.S. actions in furtherance of the paramilitary operations.
These include payment of certain sums of money to the contras for arms; numerous
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committing terrorist raids in Nicaragua.9 The Nicaraguan plaintiffs
claimed that the United States sponsored terrorist raids which vio-
meetings with them during which CIA agents and State Department officials were
promised combined funding and support; ... efforts by the United States to mold a
single contra organization out of the diverse factions.
Id. at 12-13. The complaint also alleged that:
the federal defendants provided underwater equipment and explosives for sabotage
teams to attack Puerta Cabezas, Nicaragua; that 16-20 U.S. airforce personnel, in an
operation named "Royal Duke," fl(ew] regular intelligence missions along the Hon-
duran-Nicaraguan border [and] provide[d] information . . . to the contras to enable
them to carry [out] our attacks on Nicaragua; that representatives of the U.S. Army's
Southern Command and CIA experts support[ed], train[ed] and direct[ed] terrorist
training camps in Honduras; and that the federal defendants knowingly . . .
provid[ed] substantial assistance for the launching of raids against Nicaraguan
civilians.
Id. (citations omitted).
The plaintiff-appellants' brief alleges that since the filing of the complaint:
the federal defendants have openly admitted their participation in this operation,
increased the number of CIA agents from 50 to 200, admitted that $40 million had
been spent by the United States in direct support of the contras, and admitted that
the CIA provides money, military equipment and military training to the anti-Nica-
ragua forces.
Id. at 14 (citations omitted).
9. The narrative from the plaintiff-appellants' brief describes this terror:
Twelve of the plaintiffs or their close family members have been subjected to murder,
torture, mutilation, kidnapping and rape as a result of U.S.-sponsored paramilitary
activities designed to ravage the civilian population of Nicaragua. Nine of these are
citizens of Nicaragua who sue on behalf of themselves or as personal representatives
of family members murdered and tortured. Two of the plaintiffs are the wife and
brother of Dr. Albrecht Pflaum, a medical doctor executed while working in north-
ern Nicaragua; the remaining plaintiff is the wife of Dr. Pierre Grosjean, another
medical doctor executed by contras.
The facts of the injuries to each of the plaintiffs or their family members reflect
brutal, inhumane activities, violative of fundamental laws of civilized nations. For
example, plaintiff Maria Bustillo de Blandon, a resident of Nicaragua, saw her hus-
band and five sons murdered and tortured by members of the Nicaraguan Demo-
cratic Front (FDN)-the main counterrevolutionary group funded by the federal
defendants. On October 28, 1982, the contras entered her home, seized her husband,
a lay pastor, and removed their five children from their beds. In front of the parents,
the children were tied together, castrated, their ears cut off and their throats slit. The
father was then killed.
In July 1982, 130 contras, members of the FDN, attacked San Francisco de
Guajinaqulapa, with rifles, mortars and machine guns, ransacking houses and over-
running the town. After the attackers left, plaintiff Elia Maria Espinoza found her
husband, his head smashed, and brains falling out. Seven other members of her fam-
ily were previously found dead. Plaintiff Jose Santos-Barrera found his son lying face
up, his chest bullet-ridden and his legs destroyed. Plaintiff Maria Espinal Mon-
dragon found the body of her husband, with holes in his neck, stomach and right leg.
His throat, as well as the throats of other victims lying near him, had been slit. The
attackers kidnapped eight persons, including plaintiff Javier Sanchez-Espinoza, a 15-
year-old student.
On April 8, 1983, ten contras, members of the FDN, seized a 15-year-old boy,
plaintiff Concepcion Lopez-Torres, hit him with rifles, applied a hot instrument to
his face, gave him electric shocks, and then tied him to a tree from which he escaped.
Plaintiff Myrna Cunningham, a Nicaraguan doctor working in a hospital, was cap-
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lated fundamental human rights established under international law 10
and the fourth and fifth amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion. 1 These non-resident alien plaintiffs sought monetary dam-
ages,12 as well as declaratory13 and injunctive relief14 prohibiting
further United States military involvement in Nicaragua.
The congressional plaintiffs alleged two different kinds of claims.
tured by contras who ransacked the hospital. She was threatened with death and
raped 17 times. Thirteen other women from the town were also raped.
On April 30, 1983 a vehicle containing Dr. Pflaum, a German physician, and
several others, was ambushed by contras; Dr. Pflaum identified himself as a medical
doctor and was nonetheless summarily executed.
Brief for the Appellants at 7-9, Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(citations omitted) (copy in office of Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.).
10. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 601 n.6 (D.D.C. 1983) aff'd, 770
F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The plaintiffs relied on the following provisions of international
law: American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Resolution XXX, Ninth Interna-
tional Conference of American States, reprinted in Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, Handbook of Existing Duties Pertaining to Human Rights, OEA/Ser. L/V/I1.50,
doc. 6 at 17 (1980); Charter of the Organization of American States, 2 U.S.T. 2394, as
amended, 21 U.S.T. 607; T.I.A.S. No. 6847; U.N. CHARTER; Declaration of Principles of Inter-
national Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970); Declaration on the Protection of all Persons From Being Subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at
91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838; Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce & Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United States-Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024;
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/1810, at 71 (1948).
Id.
11. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 601. The pertinent language from these amend-
ments is as follows: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " (U.S. CONsT.
amend. IV); "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law ... " Id. amend. V.
12. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, at 38, Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596
(D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (copy in office of Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp.
L..).
13. The declaratory relief sought by the plaintiffs was that "the conspiracy and acts of the
defendants violate[d] international law and treaties, the Constitution of the United States, the
National Security Act of 1947, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, the Neutrality Act, the War
Powers Resolution and the Boland Amendment." Id. at 38-39.
14. The injunctive relief sought was:
a [wirit of [miandamus and/or a preliminary and permanent injunction directing the
defendants to cease immediately funding, supplying, training, and/or participating
directly or indirectly in any and all acts of terror or violence directed against the
people and property of Nicaragua and/or aimed at overthrowing the government of
Nicaragua.
Id. Also, a writ of mandamus was sought "directing defendant Reagan to enforce the Neutral-
ity Act and other applicable federal criminal statutes or to appoint independent counsel to
enforce such laws." Id. at 39.
1988] Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan
First, that the activities of the Executive branch violated Congress'
authority under the Constitution to declare war,' 5 and laws promul-
gated thereunder,' 6 as well as provisions of the War Powers Resolu-
tion. 17 In addition, the congressional plaintiffs charged that the
15. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 598. The specific constitutional provision is article
I, section 8. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
16. Id. The Court alluded to such laws as the so-called neutrality laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 956-
62 (1982). Among the pertinent sections of this law are the following:
If two or more persons within the jurisdiction of the United States conspire to injure
or destroy specific property situated within a foreign country and belonging to a
foreign government or to any political subdivision thereof with which the United
States is at peace... and if one or more such persons commits an act within the
jurisdiction of the United States to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the
parties to the conspiracy shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than three years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 956(a) (1982).
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or
prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or
naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or
dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with
whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than $3,000 or impris-
oned not more than three years, or both.
Id. § 960.
Whoever, within the United States, furnishes, fits out, arms, or attempts to furnish,
fit or arm, any vessel, with intent that such vessel shall be employed in the service of
any foreign prince, or state, or of any colony, district, or people, to cruise, or commit
hostilities against the subjects, citizens, or property of any foreign prince or state, or
of any colony district, or people with whom the United States is at peace .... Shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Id. § 962. For an excellent discussion of the history of the Neutrality Act, and its applicability
to cases such as Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d
202 (D.C. Cir. 1985), see Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality Act. Sovereignty and
Congressional War Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1983).
17. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 598 (D.D.C. 1983). War Powers
Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1973). Section 1541 reads:
(a) Congressional declaration.
It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the
Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the
Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in
hostilities or in such situations.
(b) Congressional legislative power under necessary and proper clause.
Under article I, § 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress
shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execu-
tion, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
(c) Presidential executive power as Commander-in-Chief; limitation.
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce
United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only
pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
activities of the Executive branch violated the Boland Amendment.18
Finally, the Florida plaintiffs sought to enjoin the alleged operation of
United States sponsored paramilitary training camps located in Flor-
ida on the grounds that such camps constituted a nuisance under
Florida law. 19
All three groups of plaintiffs were unsuccessful.2° The federal
district court dismissed the claims of the Nicaraguans on the basis of
the political question doctrine. 21 The court of appeals affirmed this
order, but based its holding on the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
22
Both of the claims of the congressional plaintiffs were also dismissed
by the trial court on the basis of the political question doctrine. 23 The
court of appeals affirmed this order, 24 but relied on the mootness doc-
trine25 to uphold the dismissal of the challenge to the financing of
these activities, reasoning that only prospective relief was sought and
that the Boland Amendment had since lapsed. 26 Finally, the claims
of the Florida plaintiffs were dismissed by the lower court on the basis
of a lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.27 This order was up-
held by the court of appeals.
28
This Article focuses on the claims of the Nicaraguan plaintiffs.
What the Nicaraguan plaintiffs are asserting is no less than this: when
a nation pursues foreign policy objectives, it should be held accounta-
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or posses-
sions, or its armed forces.
Id.
18. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 598. Department of Defense Appropriations Act
of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 101(c), 96 Stat. 1830, 1855. The Boland Amendment reads in
pertinent part:
None of the funds provided in this Act may be used by the Central Intelligence
Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military train-
ing or advice, or other support for military activities, to any group or individual, not
part of a country's armed forces, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of
Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.
Id.
19. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 602. The pertinent provision of Florida law is
Title 44, § 823.05.
20. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
21. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 601 (D.D.C. 1983).
22. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 207.
23. Sanchez.Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 600.
24. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 210.
25. Id.
26. See supra note 18. The Boland Amendment restrictions were in force from 1984 to
1986.
27. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 602 (D.D.C. 1983).
28. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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ble for the human consequences of those actions. The implications of
such a position are exceedingly far ranging, which is, in some odd
sense, the most understandable explanation for why such an impor-
tant question has received so little attention to date by courts and
commentators.
29
The first part of this Article examines the rather scant attention
given to these claims by the federal district court and questions the
court's use of the political question doctrine. In addition, this section
questions whether a comparable suit could be brought at the present
time, in light of the recently uncovered atrocities committed by the
Contras and considering United States support for the Contra forces.
The second part examines the decision of the court of appeals in an
opinion written by Judge Scalia (now Justice). The third part ad-
dresses the broader question of such suits by non-resident aliens and
the role that might be played by the judiciary in this particular realm
of foreign affairs.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Political Question Doctrine
The federal district court devoted little time to the claims of the
Nicaraguan plaintiffs, despite its recognition of the "gravity and com-
plexity of the plaintiffs' claims."' 30 The court explained its treatment
of this part of the case in these terms: "In order to adjudicate the tort
claims of the Nicaraguan plaintiffs, we would have to determine the
precise nature of the United States government's involvement in the
affairs of several Central American nations, namely, Honduras, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.131 Rather than explaining why the
political question doctrine3 2 was applicable, as it had done in its treat-
29. Although Sanchez-Espinoza raises some extremely important issues, it has generally
received very little attention from scholars and commentators on the judiciary. A rare excep-
tion is Cole, Challenging Covert War: The Politics of the Political Question Doctrine, 26 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 155 (1985); see also, Rogers, Domestic Legal Challenges to US. Policy in Nicaragua,
6 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 77 (1987). See generally, Blum and Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdic-
tion Over International Human Rights Claims, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 54 (1981); Paust, Litigat-
ing Human Rights in the US. Courts, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 81 (1981).
30. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 601.
31. Id.
32. The oft-quoted language in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), setting forth the
"tests" of the political question doctrine is:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate polit-
ical department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
19881
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ment of the claims of the congressional plaintiffs, 33 the court simply
offered the conclusion that the political question doctrine barred judi-
cial inquiry into this matter, stating: "judicial resolution of this matter
is not proper at this time because it involves a nonjusticiable political
question . . . . This Court simply does not have the resources and
expertise required to oversee United States military affairs in Central
America."
34
Leaving aside the propriety of the court's use of the political
question doctrine in handling the claims of the congressional plain-
tiffs, 35 what is far from apparent is how this same political question
doctrine is similarly applicable to the tort claims of Nicaraguan citi-
zens. In order to examine the applicability of the political question
doctrine to the claims of the Nicaraguan plaintiffs, it is necessary to
break down the basis of their suit into its component parts. The first
premise of the suit was that Nicaraguan citizens were being killed and
tortured. The second premise was that the Contra forces were re-
sponsible for some of these atrocities. Finally, the premise underlying
the suit of the United States officials was that the United States gov-
ernment was providing military and economic support to the
Contras. 36
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a polit-
ical decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id.
33. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 600 (D.D.C. 1983).
34. Id.
35. For a critique of the use of the political question and equitable discretion doctrine in a
comparable case, see Gibney, Judicial Failure to Enforce Human Rights Legislation: An Alter-
native Analysis of Crockett v. Reagan, 4 HuM. RTs. ANN. 115 (1986).
36. Cole, supra note 29, at 159. At the time that Sanchez-Espinoza was filed in federal
district court, the United States had already provided the Contras with at least $19 million. It
was unclear how much money the United States had spent in supporting the Contras because
most of the money had been provided by the CIA and kept from public purview. It seems fair
to assume, however, that this $19 million figure is quite conservative. Id.
In terms of money appropriated by Congress, the Boland Amendment, supra note 18,
declared a general ban on aid to the Contras, although the measure might have allowed for
funding to interdict arms transfers from Managua to Marxist rebels in El Salvador. H.R. REP.
No. 122, 98 Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1983). One of the disputed issues raised during the Iran-
contra hearings, was whether the Boland Amendment applied to the President and the Na-
tional Security Council. See infra note 45. Despite the Boland Amendment, Congress did
allocate $24 million to the Contras for fiscal year 1984. See Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-215, § 108, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475 (1983). When the Boland
Amendment was lifted in October 1986, Congress authorized $100 million in general appropri-
ations for the Contra groups of which $30 million was earmarked for non-military aid. Mili-
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The first premise is the least controversial. The political question
doctrine should have little bearing on a judicial determination that
Nicaraguan citizens are being killed and tortured in the civil conflict
in that country. This information was readily available to policymak-
ers and the public alike,17 and a recognition of this fact by a court of
law would have been entirely appropriate.38 That is, the court could
certainly not be accused of directing United States' foreign policy in
the Central American region by simply recognizing, perhaps by judi-
cial notice, well-known events occurring in that region.
In terms of the second premise-that the Contras were commit-
ting some of the atrocities that were frequently occurring in Nicara-
gua-it is also questionable whether the political question doctrine
should be a bar to such a determination. The point to be made here is
that despite the President's repeated depiction of the Contras as "free-
dom fighters,"' 39 there was some indication that the State Department
recognized that the allegations of atrocities had some basis in fact. 40
Although one might have to read between the lines to see this, the
State Department Country Report on human rights conditions in
Nicaragua for 1983,'4 1 supports the conclusion that the State Depart-
ment was aware that the allegations of atrocities were well founded:
According to the Government, guerrillas killed some 300
soldiers and 346 civilians in 1983. There is no confirmation that
guerrilla groups have deliberately killed civilians, but some civil-
ians, including foreigners, have died in the fighting between the
Government and the guerrillas.
tary Construction Appropriation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 101(k), 100 Stat. 3341-
300 (1986).
37. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
38. In Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 358 (C.D. Cal. 1982), the court
responded to a similar challenge with these findings:
In short, the violent conditions in El Salvador are a matter of public record and
corroborated by all available accounts. The Court therefore believes that it can take
judicial notice of the following facts without having to "second guess" the Executive
Branch's analysis of events in El Salvador, as feared by defendants: (1) El Salvador is
currently in the midst of a widespread civil war; (2) the continuing military actions
by both government and insurgent forces create a substantial danger of violence to
civilians residing in El Salvador; and (3) both government forces and guerrillas have
been responsible for political persecution and human rights violations in the form of
unexplained disappearances, arbitrary arrests, torture, and murder.
Id. (citations omitted).
39. See infra note 44.
40. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1983, REPORT SUBMITTED
TO THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS BY THE DEP'T OF STATE, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 635 (1984).
41. Id.
19881
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The Government also charged the guerrillas with torturing
and summarily executing prisoners. On at least two occasions,
leaders of the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance, an anti-Govern-
ment guerrilla group, claimed to have executed one or more pris-
oners. In September, a guerrilla recanted an earlier public denial
and confessed to participation in the kidnapping and murder of a
Nicaraguan couple. There is no confirmation that guerrillas have
tortured prisoners.
42
This report was compiled the year the district court dismissed the
claim in the present suit.
The political question doctrine was most applicable to the court's
third premise, United States' support of the Contras. At the time that
suit was brought, the Nicaraguan and congressional plaintiffs were
charging that the Executive branch was aiding and abetting the Con-
tra effort,43 and that such assistance was contrary to the provisions of
the Boland Amendment," while the Executive branch was categori-
cally denying these allegations.45  An independent resolution of this
42. Id. at 635. A few things should be noted about the State Department Report. The
first is that although the report on human rights conditions in Nicaragua at least hints at some
atrocities by the contras, most of the report is devoted to detailing charges against the
Sandinista regime. A second point is that other reports on human rights conditions were, and
are, much less sanguine about the human rights record of the contras than the State Depart-
ment Report was, and still is.
For example, in its 1983 yearly report on human rights conditions, Amnesty International
portrayed the contras in these terms:
Amnesty International also received reports that the Honduran authorities and mili-
tary officials had offered both tacit and logistical support to irregular units opposed
to the current government in Nicaragua. These groups, known as the contras...
operated from Honduran territory and conducted raids during 1983 which report-
edly resulted in the "disappearance" and extrajudicial execution, in some cases on
Honduran soil, of both Honduran and Nicaraguan non-combatant civilians, includ-
ing Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1984, at 169 (1985).
43. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
45. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 600 (D.D.C. 1983) (emphasis in orig-
inal). The district court described the impasse in this language:
A second reason for finding this matter non-justiciable is the impossibility of our
undertaking independent resolution without expressing a lack of the respect due co-
ordinate branches of government. President Reagan has stated on numerous occa-
sions, to the Congress and to the public at large, that he is not violating the spirit or
letter of the Boland Amendment, or any other statutes, in Nicaragua. By all media
accounts, members of both Houses of Congress strenuously disagree with the Presi-
dent's assertion. Were this Court to decide, on a necessarily incomplete evidentiary
record, that President Reagan either is mistaken, or is shielding the truth, one or
both of the coordinate branches would be justifiably offended. At this stage, there-
fore, it is up to Congress and the President to try to resolve their differences and
jointly set a course for U.S. involvement in Central America.
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question by the judiciary might well have expressed a lack of respect
for a coordinate branch of government, and such a determination
would indeed open the possibility to multifarious pronouncements on
this question. More importantly, it is not so clear that the judicial
branch would have had discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving such a dispute.
This line of analysis will not be explored further because there is
a more intriguing question to pursue, namely, do these same obstacles
exist at the present time? To put matters a different way, would the
political question doctrine be an obstacle to a suit by Nicaraguan citi-
zens at the present time? In terms of the second premise, much more
is now known about the human rights violations of the Contra
forces. 46 Thus, a court of law would be in a much better position to
decide this particular question. In terms of the third premise, the
Iran-Contra hearings have shown quite clearly that the Executive
branch was committed to providing aid to the Contras despite the
Id. 9
46. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGrrs PRACTICES FOR 1986, REPORT SUBMITTED
BY THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS BY THE DEP'T OF STATE, 100 Cong. 1st Sess. 569 (1987). The State Department Report
for 1986 depicts human rights violations by the Contras in these terms:
The armed resistance similarly has been charged with numerous violations of human
rights, including forced recruitment, use of pressure-sensitive mines, summary execu-
tions of prisoners and regime officials, torture, kidnapings of noncombatants, and
attacks on civilians. As with most of the reports concerning the massacre of civilians
in remote areas by the Sandinista authorities, it has proven extremely difficult to
obtain objective independent verification of these charges.
Id.
Other human rights organizations have taken a much harsher line. AMERICA'S WATCH,
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1986, at 91-92 (1987).
Insofar as contra practices are concerned, they remained in 1986 as they had
been previously. They showed no respect for the laws of war, engaging in both
targeted attacks on civilians identified as Sandinista activists, and in many indiscrimi-
nate attacks which produced a large civilian death toll. The extensive use of land
mines by the contras was symptomatic of their practices; at the least these were used
indiscriminately and, given the circumstances of their placement, it appears they
were used with the deliberate intent of killing civilians....
From the standpoint of the Reagan Administration's policy, Nicaragua is a spe-
cial case. Administration officials, starting with the President and including the Na-
tional Security Council, the CIA, the State Department, and several agencies of the
government that ordinarily are not involved in foreign policy are devoted to portray-
ing the Sandinista government in the blackest light possible and, conversely, in por-
traying what they call "the democratic resistance," or "the Nicaraguan freedom
fighters," as favorably as possible. No attempt whatsoever is made to moderate such
portrayals in the light of actual performance. This is war; and by far as human rights
policy is concerned, it is perceived by the Administration as an aspect of the war.
Id. at 92 (emphasis in original); see also Ford, Questions About Human Rights Dog Contras'
Image, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 23, 1987, at 9.
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Boland Amendment. 47 Moreover, since the Boland Amendment has
since lapsed,48 the United States government has openly 49 provided
aid to the Contras. One can easily conclude that many of the unan-
swered questions that existed in 1983, questions that might have prop-
erly invoked the political question doctrine,5° have now been
answered.
5 1
Before turning to Judge Scalia's appellate court opinion, a few
final comments are necessary regarding the district court's analysis of
the political question doctrine, pertaining to. the Nicaraguan plaintiffs.
Even if one concludes that the political question doctrine should bar
certain kinds of judicial determinations, it should also be noted that
there is a tendency in this area to exaggerate both the need for judicial
deference and the issues the court addresses. For example, the district
court maintained that "in order to adjudicate the tort claims of the
Nicaraguan plaintiffs, we would have to determine the precise nature
47. Butterfield, North Says Casey Aided him on Secret Contra Program; Challenges Key
Officials, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1987, at 1; Rosenbaum, North Insists his Superiors Backed Iran-
Contra Deals; Assumes Reagan Approved, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1987, at 1.
48. The Boland Amendment was in effect from 1984 to 1986. See supra note 18.
49. An issue that warrants closer examination, but which will not be raised in this article,
is whether U.S. assistance to the contras is violative of section 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1961). Section 502(b) reads in part: "Except under circumstances spec-
ified in this Section, no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of
which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights." Id.
50. There is language in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962), which criticizes the
judicial deference so often displayed in this area. There are sweeping statements to the effect
that all questions touching foreign relations are political questions. Not only does resolution of
such issues frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise
of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature; but many such ques-
tions uniquely demand a single-voiced statement of the Government's view. Yet, it is error to
suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance. Id. (citation omitted).
For a critique of this all-too-common phenomenon in the area of U.S. immigration/refu-
gee policy see, Gibney, The Role of the Judiciary in Alien Admissions, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L.
REV. 341 (1985).
51. Special mention should be made of the ruling of the World Court against the United
States. Among other things, the court found that the United States violated the 1956 Friend-
ship Treaty between the U.S. and Nicaragua and general international law by mining Nicara-
gua's harbor. In addition, the Court also found that the United States breached the
humanitarian law of war by disseminating a manual on psychological and guerrilla warfare.
Further, the World Court found that the United States owed reparations to Nicaragua for
injuries that it has caused, although it deferred on Nicaragua's petition for $370 million until
the parties had an opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement. Abram Chayes, who repre-
sented Nicaragua before the World Court, has claimed that the decision would be the basis of a
billion dollar suit against the U.S. government. Lewis, World Court.Supports Nicaragua After
U.S. Rejected Judges' Role, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
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and extent of the U.S. government's involvement in the affairs of sev-
eral Central American countries .... -"2 The court believed a judicial
determination of the Nicaraguan claims would constitute an "oversee-
ing" 53 of United States' military affairs in Central America.
In some respects these charges are accurate, but only in terms of
the injunctive relief sought by the Nicaraguan plaintiffs. The same
cannot be said about the relief in tort for past harms allegedly caused
by the Contra forces. Providing relief in tort to noncombatants for
past harms is decidedly different from setting prospective policy.5 4
This is not foreign policy by the judiciary. The propriety of such
suits, and the purpose they may serve in a democratic society, is ana-
lyzed in Part C.
B. Sovereign Immunity
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the
claims of the Nicaraguan plaintiffs, but purportedly on the basis of
sovereign immunity rather than the political question doctrine.5 5 In
terms of the Nicaraguan citizens' claims for monetary damages, the
court held:
It would make a mockery of the doctrine of sovereign immunity if
federal courts were authorized to sanction or enjoin, by judgments
nominally against present or former Executive officers, actions that
are, concededly and as a jurisdictional necessity, official actions of
the United States.[56] Such judgments would necessarily "interfere
with the public administration,"[ 57] or "restrain the government
from acting, or ... compel it to act .... 58
In terms of the claims for injunctive relief, the court held:
The support for military operations that we are asked to terminate
has, if the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, re-
52. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 601 (D.D.C. 1983).
53. Id. at 602.
54. A recent case highlights the distinction being drawn here. See, e.g., Greenham Wo-
men Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The Greenham
case involved a suit brought on the basis that the deployment of cruise missiles in the United
Kingdom would make nuclear war more likely. The court held that such a determination was
difficult enough for the political branches to make, and next to impossible for a court to make.
Contrast this sort of determination with the claim of the Nicaraguan plaintiffs for past tortious
harms.
55. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
56. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
57. Id. (quoting Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947)).
58. Id. (quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704
(1949)) (citations omitted).
19881
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J
ceived the attention and approval of the President, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the CIA, and
involves the conduct of our diplomatic relations with at least four
foreign states-Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Argentina.
Whether or not this is, as the District Court thought, a matter so
entirely committed to the care of the political branches as to pre-
clude our considering the issue at all, we think it at least requires
the withholding of discretionary relief.59
Judge Scalia's use of the sovereign immunity doctrine has several
features which should be explored. First, Judge Scalia distinguishes
domestic sovereign immunity from foreign sovereign immunity. 60 He
contends that the suit by the Nicaraguan citizens is barred by domes-
tic sovereign immunity. 6' Moreover, Scalia takes special pains to dis-
tinguish Sanchez-Espinoza62 from Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.63  The
juxtaposition of these two cases, however, leads to an incongruous
result.
Filartiga 4 allowed a suit in a United States court by a
Paraguayan citizen against a member of the armed services of Para-
guay for alleged harms occurring in Paraguay. Sanchez-Espinoza,65
on the other hand, bars a suit brought in a United States court by
citizens of another country for harm caused by the United States it-
self. It should be apparent that the United States has a much greater
interest, and certainly a much greater involvement, in the second suit
59. Id. at 208.
60. Id. at 207 n.5. Justice Scalia takes this position:
Since the doctrine of foreign immunity is quite distinct from the doctrine of domestic
sovereign immunity that we apply here, being based upon considerations of interna-
tional comity, rather than separation of powers, it does not necessarily follow an
Alien Tort Statute suit filed against the officer of a foreign sovereign would have to be
dismissed. Thus, nothing in today's decision necessarily conflicts with the decision of
the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. (citations omitted).
Id.
61. Id.
62. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
63. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). One of the ironies about Filar-
tiga is that at the request of the court of appeals, the Justice and State Departments filed an
amicus brief for the United States. This brief urged the court to hear the case. It counseled
that the law of nations includes universally accepted and enforceable human rights guarantees,
including the proscription of torture, and the protection of fundamental human rights. The
brief also took the position that the political question doctrine was not applicable, and that "a
refusal to recognize a private cause of action ... might seriously damage the credibility of our
nation's commitment to the protection of human rights." Cole, supra note 29, at 155.
64. Id.
65. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07.
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than in the first. 66 After all, the alleged harm has been caused by
agents of the United States government. Yet, the end result is that
one case can be brought in a United States court and the other
cannot. 6
7
In addition to drawing a distinction between domestic and for-
eign sovereign immunity, 6 Judge Scalia also attempted to draw a dis-
tinction between acts that were authorized by the sovereign69 (and
thus covered by the doctrine of sovereign immunity) and acts that
were not authorized by the sovereign (and thus labeled "private
wrongdoing"). 70 However, it is by no means clear that Filartiga71 in-
volved a case of private wrongdoing, as opposed to torture being a
part of state terror in that country. 72 Secondly, if unauthorized activi-
ties are not covered by the sovereign immunity doctrine, as Judge
Scalia contends, then this determination works against the argument
he is ultimately trying to make when one speaks of the unauthorized
(by Congress, at least) and apparently illegal activities of the National
Security Council in providing aid to the Contras.
73
66. Cole, supra note 29, describes the inconsistency in the U.S. government's position this
way:
The government's reversal cannot be attributable to a change in the law. The same
violation is alleged under the same statute; only the defendants have changed. While
the plaintiffs in Filartiga asked the United States to apply international human rights
law to foreign officials, those in Sanchez-Espinoza sought to have the United States
apply that law to its own officials. The contrast in the Justice Department's stand
with respect to these two cases suggests that it considers it appropriate to apply fun-
damental norms of international law to Paraguay, but not to the United States.
Id. at 156.
67. One of the exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982), is
for claims "arising in a foreign country." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982). It might well be
claimed that this exception would preclude a suit such as that brought by the Nicaraguan
plaintiffs in Sanchez-Espinoza because the harms occurred in Nicaragua or Honduras. In the
"Agent Orange" litigation, Federal District Court Judge Weinstein interpreted this provision
to mean that a tort claim "arises" at the place where the negligent act or omission occurred,
not necessarily where the injury occurred. Judge Weinstein then concluded: "Applying the
above analysis to the case at bar, it is undisputed that the initial decision to use Agent Orange,
the decision to continue using it, and decisions relating to the specifications for Agent Orange
were made in this country." In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp.
1242, 1255 (1984).
68. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
69. Id. at 207.
70. Id.
71. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. For example, Judge Kaufman's opinion referred to these deliberate acts of torture as
being "under color of official authority." Id. at 878. For a discussion of this point and the
Filartiga case, see generally Comment, Torture as a Tort in Violation of International Law:
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 33 STAN. L. REV. 353, 364 (1981).
73. See supra note 18.
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Another aspect of Judge Scalia's opinion has already been
touched on before, 74 namely, the rationale that a judicial decree
would be "restraining" 75 or "compelling" 7 6 the United States govern-
ment to act a certain way. Again, a much stronger case for this argu-
ment can be made for the injunctive relief sought. The same cannot
be said of relief for past harms. The granting of relief for past harms
will not reflect negatively on both past and present activities, that
much is certain. However, seeking relief from a court for past harms
is qualitatively different from dictating prospective United States for-
eign policy.
By way of concluding this section, despite the arguments set
forth explaining why the sovereign immunity doctrine should not
have been a bar to this suit by Nicaraguan citizens for alleged harm
caused by the United States supported Contras, still, Sanchez-Espi-
noza will no doubt prove to be a difficult precedent to overcome.
However, it should also be pointed out that there are other possible
causes of action that Nicaraguan citizens have available to them.
Under the Filartiga doctrine, 77 it might be possible for Nicara-
guan citizens to bring a suit under the Alien Tort Statute7 8 against
members of the Contra forces for the violations of human rights.7
9
Nicaraguan citizens may also have a claim against United States citi-
zens who have provided economic assistance to the Contra forces.
74. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 598 (D.D.C. 1983); Greenham Wo-
men Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
75. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
76. Id.
77. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (opening the federal courts
for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international law); see supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
78. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976), which states that: "the district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." (original version in Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73).
79. There are at least two potential obstacles to such a suit. One is the still unanswered
question whether the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976), is merely jurisdictional, or
whether it also creates a private cause of action. Judge Kaufman in Filartiga, and Judge Ed-
wards in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 777-82 (D.C. Cir. 1984), held that
the statute establishes a private cause of action. In Tel-Oren, Judge Bork took the opposite
position in his concurring opinion. Id. at 810-19 (Bork, J., concurring).
A second possible obstacle would involve the status of the Contras. Judge Edwards' con-
curring opinion in Tel-Oren upholding the dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit was premised on the
fact that he was unwilling to extend Filartiga to tortious conduct committed by a party other
than a recognized state or one of its officals acting under color of state law. Id. at 776 (Ed-
wards, J., concurring). In many respects, the Contras would share the same kind of status as
such non-state terrorist organizations.
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These private citizens have provided monetary assistance and weap-
ons to the Contras8° and either know, or should know, of the atroci-
ties that have been committed by them. As a result, these individuals
may well face liability under the law. 81
C. Responsibility for Human Consequences
Sanchez-Espinoza8 2 raises a number of important political ques-
tions including: should nations be held responsible for the human con-
sequences of their foreign policy pursuits? If so, what role should the
judiciary of the country causing harm play in such determinations?
To begin this analysis, it is essential not only to understand how
unique the claims of the Nicaraguan plaintiffs are, 83 but also to recog-
nize that such claims do have some ground in both domestic and in-
ternational law. On one level the Nicaraguan citizens are seeking
restitution analogous to war reparations,8 4 a universally recognized, if
still underdeveloped,8 5 doctrine in international law.8 6
80. Nicaragua Rebels Reported to Raise Millions in Gifts, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1984, at 1,
col. 6; Thatcher, Private Donors to Contras 'Misled' on 'Overhead' Costs, Christian Sci. Moni-
tor, May 22, 1987, at 1. For a moral condemnation of those who give such funds see, Gibney,
Citizen Involvement in Central America, 246 CONTEMP. REV. 225-29 (May 1985).
81. See Note, The Iran-Contra Affair, the Neutrality Act, and the Statutory Definition of
"At Peace," 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 343 (1987).
82. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
83. One point that deserves clarification is that only civilian non-combatants should be
able to allege harm. Soldiers have accepted the risk of being harmed, while civilians have not.
For a discussion of this point, see, M. GIBNEY, STRANGERS OR FRIENDS: PRINCIPLES FOR A
NEW ALIEN ADMISSION POLICY 86-88 (1986).
84. War claims are described as:
those which arise from and are deemed to be chargeable to the conduct of a State
while a belligerent, or while engaged in hostilities as though it were one. Such claims
are of great variety. They may be founded on any form of activity incidental to the
prosecution of war, whether on sea or land, and whether attributable to the military
or civil arm of the government. Thus they may spring from the conduct of the com-
mander of a submarine or that of the occupant of enemy territory; they may grow
out of the acts of an army in the field, br of a collector of a port. Such claims may
have an enemy as well as neutral origin. The treaty of peace terminating the conflict
may, however, contain a waiver of such claims, or it may provide that one party shall
• . . adjust those possessed by its nationals against its former enemy. Again, the
treaty may burden one party with responsibility for illegal acts attributable to it, and
impose a duty upon it to meet claims of nationals of the enemy arising therefrom.
C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED
STATES 952-53 (1947) (citations omitted).
85. For example, William Bishop has written:
The international law relating to war claims appears to be one of the least satisfac-
tory parts of the law of state responsibility and international claims. Both interna-
tional wars and civil wars usually entail extensive destruction of property and
widespread personal injury and violent death. Nationals of the belligerent states (or
of the state where civil war rages), as well as nationals of neutral states taking no part
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There are comparisons in domestic law as well. In this regard
the recent decision in Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger8 7 is particu-
larly noteworthy. Ramirez de Arellano involved a suit brought in a
federal court by a United States citizen who alleged that the United
States government had unlawfully seized and destroyed his property
in Honduras during the course of military maneuvers in that coun-
try.8 8 In overturning the district court's dismissal of this claim,89 the
court of appeals stressed that the government could not hide behind
the political question doctrine.90
The plaintiffs did not seek judicial monitoring of foreign policy in
Central America nor did they challenge the United States' relations
with any foreign country. The case did not raise the specter of judi-
cial control and management of United States foreign policy.91
The court then went on to say, "The Executive's power to con-
duct foreign relations free from unwarranted supervision of the Judi-
ciary cannot give the Executive carte blanche to trample the most
fundamental liberty and property rights of this country's citizenry." 92
Ramirez de Arellano raises a number of interesting questions.
For example, to what extent should it matter that the plaintiff was a
United States citizen rather than a citizen of Honduras? Logically
there is no distinction, although there might be such a distinction in
the law.93 A second question involves the fact that this was an action
in the conflict, are among the victims of war losses. Yet it is seldom that claims of
one belligerent against the other, or of neutrals against either belligerent, are submit-
ted to an international tribunal for adjudication according to general rules of interna-
tional law.
W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 695-96 (2d. ed. 1962) (emphasis
in original).
86. One of the more unique forms of war reparations involves that being paid to victims
of Nazi war crimes. See B. FERENCA, LESS THAN SLAVES (1979).
87. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), va-
cated and rem'd, 471 U.S. 1113, (1985) (remanded in light of the Foreign Assistance and
Related Appropriations Act, 1985, and efforts by Honduras to make restitution), rev'd, 788
F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (withdrawal of all U.S. personnel fundamentally altered the balance
of equities).
88. Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1505.
89. 568 F. Supp. 1236 (D.D.C. 1983).
90. Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1514-15.
91. Id. at 1513.
92. Id. at 1515 (emphasis in original).
93. For example, Judge Wilkey, for a majority of the court, writes: "It is settled law that
the Executive's power to take the private property of United States citizens must stem from an
act of Congress or from the Constitution itself." Id. at 1510. In response to an assertion by
the defendants that ownership of a Honduran corporation bars standing to bring suit in a
United States court, Judge Wilkey writes:
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involving property. The court repeatedly made mention of the pro-
tection of property by the judiciary.94 Whether a tort claim would
have received the same judicial reception is unclear. 95 Again, it is
maintained here that this should not matter.
The point to be underscored is that there is some recognition-
perhaps a growing one96-that individuals who are harmed by an-
other country in this country's pursuit of foreign policy goals should
be protected and compensated. Thus, on one level, the Nicaraguan
plaintiffs in Sanchez-Espinoza97 are not asking for the unthinkable.
On another level, however, these claims are asking just that. Sanchez-
Espinoza 98 is calling for a very different perspective on how relations
between nation-states are conducted, and it is suggesting that we es-
sentially rethink what the relationship between one nation and citi-
zens of another country should be.99
One political argument against the position taken by the Nicara-
guan plaintiffs is that it seemingly knows no bounds. A comparable
argument was set forth in Judge Robb's concurring opinion in Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic. °0 This case involved a suit brought in
a United States court by Israeli citizens against various factions of the
It is bizarre to posit that the claimed seizure and destruction of the United States
plaintiffs' multi-million dollar investment, businesses, property, assets, and land is
not an injury to a protected property interest. The suggestion that a United States
citizen who is the sole beneficial owner of viable business operations does not have
constitutional rights against United States government officials' [sic] threatened com-
plete destruction of corporate assets is preposterous. If adopted by this court, the
proposition would obliterate the constitutional property rights of many United States
citizens abroad and would make a mockery of decades of United States policy on
transnational investments.
Id. at 1515-16. What is puzzling about this kind of analysis, however, is that U.S. courts have
been quite reluctant to offer a similar kind of protection for the property-and lives---of for-
eign citizens.
94. Id. at 1512. "The federal courts historically have resolved disputes over land, even
when the United States military is occupying the property at issue." Id. (citation omitted).
95. For a discussion of tort claims brought by aliens against the United States from
events occurring outside the United States, See Cole, supra note 29, at 186 n.156.
96. See, e.g., Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that
Chile could be held liable under international and domestic law for assassinating a civilian);
Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1772, slip. op. (C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that torture is not
protected by the act of state doctrine).
97. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
98. Id.
99. What this is suggesting is that if nations were held accountable for the harm caused to
others in the pursuit of "national interests" or "national security," one might expect the pur-
suit of such goals to be undertaken with much more regard for the human consequences.
Certainly the world would look far different than it does today.
100. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J.,
concurring).
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Palestine Liberation Organization for events occurring during an at-
tack on a bus in Israel.' 10 Judge Robb explained the attractiveness of
such suits, but also his fears of the judiciary entering into this realm:
We are here confronted with the easiest case and thus the most
difficult to resist. It was a similar magnet that drew the Second
Circuit into its unfortunate position in Filartiga. But not all cases
of this type will be so easy. Indeed, most would be far less attrac-
tive. The victims of international violence perpetrated by terrorists
are spread across the globe. It is not implausible that every alleged
victim of violence of the counter-revolutionaries in such places as
Nicaragua and Afghanistan could argue just as compellingly as the
plaintiffs here do, that they are entitled to their day in the courts of
the United States. The victims of the recent massacres in Lebanon
could also mount such claims. Indeed, there is no obvious or sub-
tle limiting principle in sight.
10 2
This "slippery slope" argument is haunting. Even so, it is impor-
tant to keep it in perspective. Sadly enough, Judge Robb correctly
points out that there is an almost incomprehensible level of political
violence and terror in the world. Asking the courts of this country to
rectify this situation would be a senseless task indeed. However,
courts in this country can and should begin to ensure that the human
consequences of United States foreign policy pursuits 10 3 are not ig-
nored. This does not mean that a suit like Filartiga 104 should not be
heard in a United States court. Instead, the suggestion presses the
point that the United States judiciary be especially attuned to the
harm caused by the political branches of this country. 10 5 In this re-
spect, regardless of the remarkable decision in Filartiga,106 it would
have been even more extraordinary and, in many respects, more en-
couraging, if such a decision had been rendered by a Paraguayan
court, rather than by a United States court. The same is being as-
serted with respect to courts in this country.
10 7
101. Id.
102. Id. at 826 (citation omitted).
103. For a similar argument, see Comment, The Alien Tort Statute: United States Jurisdic-
tion Over Acts of Torture Committed Abroad, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 103, 120 (1980).
104. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
105. For an extended discussion of what I have termed the Harm Principle (HP), see,
Gibney, supra note 80, at 79-102.
106. Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876.
107. Examples where the judiciary will find fault with the political branches in the realm
of foreign affairs are few and far between. However, in some recent instances the judiciary has
been quite searching in its review of actions of the political branches. One notable case of this
occuring was Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Another note-
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In Sanchez-Espinoza,0 8 Judge Scalia argued for judicial restraint
and reasoned that if a proper remedy in fact existed for the Nicara-
guan plaintiffs, it ought to be fashioned by the political branches. 10 9
This reasoning conveniently ignores, of course, that the political
branches will not do this. Unfortunately, nations are not in the prac-
tice of either looking at the human consequences of their own ac-
tions,1 or admitting mistakes in the pursuit of their own "national
interest." Thus, Scalia's position has a hollow ring to it.
Could one expect the judiciary to respond differently than the
political branches have?"' There is no assurance, of course, that a
court of law would respond any differently than would the political
branches. Nor would there be any expected response if judges simply
viewed their own role as akin to those in the political branches. It
appears quite possible, however, that the judiciary could play a unique
role in this area. 12 Judge Scalia viewed the case in terms of separa-
tion of powers," 3 yet part of the notion of separation of powers is that
there will be mutual checks oneach branch of government. However,
in terms of the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, checks are few and
far between.' 14
worthy case in this regard was the courageous decision of Judge King in Haitian Refugee
Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd as modified sub nom., Haitian
Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
108. 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
109. Id. at 209.
110. Michael Teitelbaum describes such a situation involving the generation of refugee
populations:
Foreign policies have frequently served (often unintentionally) to stimulate interna-
tional migrations. In particular, foreign military or political interventions, or inter-
nal or external responses to intervention, often result in mass migrations. Foreign-
policy makers rarely evaluate such effects seriously when considering intervention.
Instead, they perceive the possible refugee consequences (if they consider them at all)
more as a problem for "others," if the flow is to other countries, or alternatively as an
obligation that the intervenor [sic] owes to local collaborators, if the intervention
proves unsuccessful. Importantly, the intervening power does not necessarily see
even the possible future need to admit such dependent populations as refugees as a
serious cost of policy failure.
Teitelbaum, Immigration, Refugees and Foreign Policy, IN] 'L ORG. 429, 433 (1984).
111. It might also be true, however, that judges view the world from the same perspective
as those in the political branches. For a depiction of this occurring in South Africa, see Pitts,
Judges in an Unjust Society: The Case of South Africa, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 49 (1986).
112. For a general discussion of the relationship between domestic courts and interna-
tional law, see R. FALK, THE ROLE OF THE DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER (1964).
113. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
114. Robert Johansen describes the abandonment of the checks and balances system this
way: "Too many interests within the United States executive branch, Congress, and the judi-
cial system are all on the same (national) side of the global issues. Instead of the threefold
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III. CONCLUSION
This Article asserts that, rather than hide at the mention of "for-
eign affairs," the judicial branch in our system of government has an
enormously important role to play. Courts in this country ought to
serve as a check on the human consequences of American foreign pol-
icy forays.11 5 Clearly, the courts are not being asked to dictate or
oversee policy, or to determine the precise nature of the United States
government's involvement in the affairs of other countries. In fact,
this Article asks them to do much the opposite: to ignore the minutia
of United States foreign policy and, instead, focus on its more global
aspects.
separation of powers extant on domestic questions, there is a threefold concentration of mutu-
ally reinforcing powers on global issues." R. JOHANSEN, THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE
HUMAN INTEREST 381 (1980).
115. For a discussion of the role courts could play as a "moral check" in matters concern-
ing foreign policy, see Gibney, The Refugee Act of 1980: A Humanitarian Standard, 21 GONZ.
L. REv. 585, 596-602 (1985-86).
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